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Abstract
Received wisdom suggests that most exporters sell the majority of their output domestically. In
this paper, however, we show that the distribution of export intensity not only varies substan-
tially across countries, but in a large number of cases is also bimodal, displaying what we refer
to as twin peaks. We reconcile this new stylized fact with an otherwise standard, two-country
model of trade in which firms are heterogeneous in terms of the demand they face in each market.
We show that when firm-destination-specific revenue shifters are distributed lognormal, gamma,
or Fre´chet with sufficiently high dispersion, the distribution of export intensity has two modes
in the boundaries of the support and their height is determined by a country’s size relative to
the rest of the world. We estimate the deep parameters characterizing the distribution of export
intensity. Our results show that when the conditions for the existence of twin peaks are met,
differences in relative market size can explain most of the observed variation in the distribution
of export intensity across the world.
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1 Introduction
Received wisdom suggests that most exporters sell the majority of their output domestically
(Bernard et al., 2003; Brooks, 2006; Arkolakis, 2010; Eaton et al., 2011). This is considered one
of the key empirical regularities that characterize the behavior of firms engaged in international
trade, summarized in the reviews by Bernard et al. (2007) and Melitz and Redding (2014).1
In this paper we challenge this notion. Using harmonized cross-country firm-level data from
the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES), we show that the distribution of export intensity —
the share of sales accounted for by exports conditional on exporting— varies tremendously across
countries.2 This is vividly illustrated in Figure 1. Countries like Argentina, Russia and South
Africa exhibit the same pattern identified in previous studies; firms with export intensity below
0.2 constitute more than half of exporters, while firms with an export intensity above 0.8 account
for less than 10% of exporters. In Bangladesh, Madagascar and the Philippines, we observe the
opposite pattern —the average share of exporters with intensity below 0.2 and above 0.8 are,
respectively, 11% and 75%. A large number of countries (China, Ireland and Uruguay, to name a
few) also display ‘twin peaks’ —a high concentration of firms on both ends of the distribution. In
fact, we find that unimodality is rejected for two-thirds of the countries in our data. To the best
of our knowledge, we are the first in identifying this novel stylized fact.
The workhorse models of international trade in which firms only differ in their productivity,
such as Melitz (2003), are at odds with the wide range of patterns presented in Figure 1. In a two-
country model with CES preferences, all exporters sell the same share of their revenues abroad; i.e.
the distribution of export intensity is degenerate. When there are more than two countries, more
productive firms have a higher export intensity than less productive ones, because the former serve
more markets than the latter. If the model is to be consistent with the well-established fact that
a small number of large firms coexist with a large number of small firms (see Simon and Bonini,
1958; Axtell, 2001), then it would not be able to generate right-skewed nor bimodal export intensity
distributions.3
We show, however, that with one single adjustment, the standard two-country model of trade
with CES preferences can reproduce the wide variety of shapes depicted in Figure 1 very successfully.
Namely, we require large idiosyncratic differences in the demand that firms face domestically and
abroad. When the firm-destination-specific revenue shifters that generate these differences are
distributed lognormal, gamma or Fre´chet —three of the distributions most frequently used to
model firm heterogeneity— with sufficiently high dispersion, then the probability density function
of export intensity is bimodal. The modes of the distribution are located near 0 and 1 and their
1The other two stylized facts identified by the literature are that only a minority of firms engage in exporting and
that exporters perform better than domestic firms. These two results have been verified for almost every country in
the world.
2In Section 2 we show that these patterns also arise when we use more representative data from national manu-
facturing surveys.
3The positive correlation between productivity and export intensity also arises in the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)
two-country model with quasi-linear utility. This again implies that the distribution of export intensity inherits the
properties of the productivity distribution.
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Figure 1: Export Intensity Distribution Across Countries: Selected Examples
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The figure depicts the kernel density of export intensity, the share of total sales accounted for by
exports among exporters. The data, which is described in detail in Section 2, comes from the World
Bank Enterprise Surveys.
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‘height’ is determined by a country’s relative market size with respect to the rest of the world. Thus,
the interaction between large heterogeneity in firms’ performance across markets and differences in
relative market size can explain the observed variation in the distribution of export intensity across
countries.
Using firm-level data for 72 countries drawn from several waves of the WBES over the period
2002-2016, we estimate the deep parameters that characterize the distribution of export intensity.
These are the shape parameter of the distribution of firm-destination-specific revenue shifters and a
country’s relative market size with respect to the rest of the world. We tease out the latter directly
from the data by exploiting the fact that for all the underlying distributions of revenue shifters
we consider, there is a one-to-one relationship between relative market size and the median export
intensity which is independent of the shape parameter. Conditional on this inferred measure of
relative market size, we estimate the shape parameter by maximum likelihood. The identification of
the parameters is very transparent: if the conditions for twin peaks are satisfied, greater dispersion
of revenue shifters (which is determined by the shape parameter) increases the distribution’s mass
in the extremes of the support. For a given level of dispersion, changes in market size shift mass
from one extreme of the support to other. Conversely, if the dispersion of revenue shifters is not
sufficiently high, then the distribution of export intensity would be unimodal and its mass would
be tightly concentrated around its median in the interior of the support.
The results provide strong support for the existence of twin peaks. When we estimate country-
specific scale and shape parameters, the conditions for bimodality are satisfied in all but a handful
of cases. We then estimate a model in which all cross-country variation in the distribution of
export intensity is accounted for by differences in relative market size, since firms in every country
draw revenue shifters from a distribution with the same shape parameter. Our results are striking.
Conditional on relative market size, we are are able to fit the distribution of export intensity
across the wide range of countries in our data with only one shape parameter. This provides the
main takeaway message from the paper: conditional on firm-destination-specific factors exhibiting
sufficiently high dispersion, differences in relative market size explain most of the observed variation
in the distribution of export intensity across the world.
We carry out a thorough robustness analysis of our main result. More specifically, we explore
the possibility that the bimodality of the export intensity distribution is the result of a composition
effect —i.e. if most exporters were low-intensity ones, but specific subsets were particularly inclined
to export most of their output. We find that the dispersion of firm-destination-specific revenue
shifters remains sufficiently high to generate bimodality when we exclude multinational affiliates,
firms engaged in processing activities, and even firms exporting all their output. Similarly, excluding
countries that provide subsidies conditioned on firms’ export performance or splitting our sample
according to countries’ level of development leaves our results intact. We also show that bimodality
is not a product of a country’s sectoral composition of exports. In our last robustness exercise, we
work directly with domestic and export sales instead of export intensity data. Doing so allows us
to validate the relative market size estimates based on the median export intensity and to carry
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out a variance decomposition of sales in each market. The latter reveals that —consistent with the
empirical literature relying on customs data (Kee and Krishna, 2008; Munch and Nguyen, 2014;
Lawless and Whelan, 2014, e.g.)— firm-destination-specific factors account for a large share of the
variation in firms’ sales in a given destination.
Understanding export intensity is important on its own right. In the paper we show that the
existence of twin peaks affects the response of the export intensity distribution to reductions in
trade costs as well as the sales diversification benefits of exporting. Characterizing accurately the
distribution of export intensity in an undistorted economy is also a key input to infer the magnitude
of distortions that affect firms’ access to foreign markets, following the approach pioneered by Hsieh
and Klenow (2009). This strategy has been used by Brooks and Wang (2016) to quantify the effect
of idiosyncratic trade taxes and preferential access to foreign exchange, and by Defever and Rian˜o
(2017a) to evaluate the welfare cost of incentives subject to export performance requirements.
Alessandria and Avila (2017) rely on changes in the distribution of export intensity over time to
discipline a model that quantifies the contribution of technology and trade policy in Colombia’s
process of trade opening. Export intensity has also been show to be strongly correlated with a wide
variety of outcomes such as female employment (Ozler, 2000), lobbying activity on trade policy
(Osgood et al., 2017) and financial constraints (Egger and Erhardt, 2014). Kohn et al. (2017)
show that the response of aggregate exports to large devaluations in emerging markets, where
exporters often borrow in foreign currency, is crucially shaped by the distribution of export intensity.
Alfaro et al. (2017) show that differences in average export intensity explain why East Asian firms’
productivity and R&D investment are more responsive to real exchange rate depreciations than
their counterparts in Europe and Latin America.
Our paper is related to several strands in the literature. First, we add to the recent work that
investigates the implications of using different probability distributions to model firm heterogeneity
in international trade models (Head et al., 2014; Mra´zova´ et al., 2015; Nigai, 2017). While most of
this literature focuses on productivity, we highlight the importance of the idiosyncratic interaction
between individual firms and markets. The importance of firm-destination factors in explaining
export sales variation has been identified by Eaton et al. (2011), Crozet et al. (2012) and Fernandes
et al. (2015). We show that this feature of the data can also explain the variation of the export
intensity distribution across countries. Our work is also related to Lu (2010) and Defever and Rian˜o
(2017a), who first documented the fact that the export intensity distribution in China is markedly
bimodal. Our work shows that this pattern is not specific to China, and is, in fact, quite common
across the world.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data used in our analysis,
documents the prevalence of bimodality in the distribution of export intensity across countries and
provides a comparison with more representative, national firm-level surveys for a selected subset of
countries. Section 3 presents our theoretical framework. We show the conditions under which the
distribution of export intensity is bimodal and discuss implications of the existence of twin peaks.
Section 4 presents the identification strategy we follow in our estimation and our benchmark results.
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Section 5 reports the results of an extensive battery of robustness checks to our main specification.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
Our data comes from several waves of the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES) spanning the
period 2002-2016. These surveys are carried out by the World Bank’s Enterprise Analysis Unit
(usually every 3-4 years) using a uniform methodology and questionnaire, and are intended to be
representative of a country’s non-agricultural private economy.4 The unit of observation in the
surveys is the establishment, i.e. a physical location where business is carried out or industrial
operations take place, which should have its own management and control over its own workforce.
Since the vast majority of establishments surveyed report to be single-establishment firms, hereafter
we refer to them as ‘firms’. We use the data for the manufacturing sector only (i.e. firms that belong
to ISIC Rev. 3.1 sectors 15-37).
The WBES provides information on firms’ main sector of operation, total sales, export intensity,
ownership status (whether the firm is domestic or foreign-owned), labor productivity and the share
of material inputs accounted for by imports. The main variable of interest is export intensity —the
share of sales that a firm exported, both directly or indirectly through an intermediary, in a fiscal
year— and is therefore defined on the interval p0, 1s.5
Our sample consists of 72 developing and transition countries (with the exception of Ireland
and Sweden), for which we observe at least 97 exporting firms when we pool the data across all
available survey waves. Table 1 lists the countries in our sample and provides information on the
number of exporters and survey waves. The number of exporters per country ranges from 97 in
Ireland to 2,112 in India, accounting, on average, for 40% of firms surveyed in a country. In terms
of geographic coverage, the countries in our data are evenly distributed across Eastern Europe,
Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia and the Middle East and Africa; Ireland and Sweden are
the only two countries in our sample from Western Europe.
Table 1 also indicates whether a country provides incentives that are directly conditioned on
firms’ export intensity.6 Defever and Rian˜o (2017a) investigate the effects that these subsidies
subject to export share requirements (ESR) have on the intensity of competition and welfare in the
context of China. We rely on information from the “Performance Requirements and Incentives” and
“Foreign Trade Zones/Free Trade Zones” sections of the Investment Climate Statements produced
by the U.S. State Department to identify countries offering these incentives. Table 1 reveals that
4More specifically, the survey targets formal (registered) firms with more than 5 employees that are not 100%
state-owned.
5Since the survey asks firms directly about the percentage of their sales exported, the response is bounded at
100%, and therefore does not capture ‘carry along’ trade —a phenomenon first identified by Bernard et al. (2012)—
in which firms export goods that they do not produce.
6Examples include direct cash transfers, tax holidays and deductions, and the provision of utilities at below-market
rates. These incentives require recipient firms to export more than a certain share of their output. They are frequently
used in special economic zones and duty-drawback regimes.
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subsidies subject to ESR are pervasive in developing countries, with half of the countries in our
data employing them.
Table 2: Firm Characteristics by Export Status and Export Intensity
Employment Output Output % Foreign- % Imported
per worker owned inputs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Non-Exporters 0.5 0.5 0.8 6.0 23.7
Exporters
Export intensity:
P p0.0, 0.2s 1.7 2.1 1.4 17.4 37.7
P p0.2, 0.4s 1.5 1.8 1.3 18.8 35.6
P p0.4, 0.6s 1.7 1.9 1.3 21.0 35.2
P p0.6, 0.8s 2.3 2.3 1.4 23.0 35.4
P p0.8, 1.0s 2.2 2.3 1.6 31.1 41.0
Columns (1)-(3) report the average across countries of the relative size and labor productivity of ex-
porters and domestic firms relative to the mean value of each variable calculated in each country-survey
year cell. Thus, for instance, domestic firms across all countries in our sample are 50% smaller (in terms
of employment) than the average firm, while exporters with an export intensity lower than 20% are
70% larger than the average firm. Column (4) reports the percentage of foreign-owned firms (firms with
a share of foreign equity at least 10% or greater) and column (5) presents the percentage of imported
inputs in total intermediate inputs in each export intensity bin.
Table 2 provides a first pass at the data comparing exporters (along the distribution of export
intensity) with domestic firms across various performance measures. Columns (1)-(3) provide in-
formation on firm size and productivity relative to the average value of the respective statistic in
each country-survey year pair. Columns (4) and (5) report the percentage of foreign-owned firms
and the use of imported inputs. Table 2 reveals that —consistent with the evidence summarized
by Bernard et al. (2007) and Melitz and Redding (2014)— exporters are larger (both in terms of
employment and output) and more productive than domestic firms in our sample. Looking across
the export intensity distribution, we find that although there is a positive correlation between firm
size and export intensity, there is not a clear relationship between labor productivity and export
intensity.7 Columns (4) and (5) show that exporters — and high-intensity ones in particular— are
more likely to be foreign-owned (Antra`s and Yeaple, 2014) and to use imported intermediate inputs
more intensively than domestic firms (Amiti and Konings, 2007).
While Figure 1 provides suggestive evidence about export intensity distributions exhibiting
twin peaks, we now carry out a systematic statistical test of unimodality in our data, using the
so-called dip statistic proposed by Hartigan and Hartigan (1985). This test measures departures
from unimodality in the empirical cumulative distribution function (cdf) by relying on the fact that
7Dı´az de Astarloa et al. (2013) and Heid et al. (2013) find that high-intensity exporters are larger than domestic
firms and other exporters in Bangladesh and Mexico respectively. Defever and Rian˜o (2017b), however, document
that firms that export all their output in China, although larger and more productive than domestic firms, are smaller
and less productive than low-intensity exporters.
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Figure 2: Dip Test of Unimodality of Export Intensity
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Unimodal Bimodal
The figure reports the value of the Hartigan and Hartigan (1985) dip test statistic of unimodality. Countries are
identified as having having a unimodal export intensity distribution if their dip statistic does not reject the null
hypothesis of unimodality at the 1% confidence level; otherwise, they are identified as bimodal. The reported value of
the dip statistic is calculated as the mean across 1,000 bootstrapped samples of 200 exporters drawn for each country.
The algorithm used to calculate the dip test statistic is adjusted to take into account the discreteness of the export
intensity data.
a unimodal distribution has a unique inflection point.8 As Henderson et al. (2008) note, the dip
measures the amount of ‘stretching’ needed to render the empirical cdf of a multi-modal distribution
unimodal. Thus, a higher value for the dip leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis of unimodality.
Hartigan and Hartigan (1985) choose the uniform distribution as the null distribution because its
dip is the largest among all unimodal distributions. The dip test has been widely used in economics
to, among other things, identify convergence clusters in the distribution of GDP per capita, total
factor productivity and other indicators of economic growth (Henderson et al., 2008), characterize
the degree of price stickiness (Cavallo and Rigobon, 2011) and to assess the identification of hazard
function estimates (Heckman and Singer, 1984).
Figure 2 presents the dip statistic for all countries in our sample. We identify the distribution of
export intensity in a country as unimodal if the null hypothesis of the dip statistic is not rejected at
the 1% significance level at least; otherwise, we consider it to be bimodal.9 Based on this criterion,
we find that the distribution of export intensity is bimodal in 47 out of 72 countries. As we noted
in the introduction, this result stands in sharp contrast with previous work suggesting that this
8More precisely, the cdf is convex on the interval p´8, xmq and concave between pxm,`8q, where xm denotes the
unique mode of the distribution.
9Although the dip test only tells us whether a distribution is unimodal or not, visual inspection of kernel densities
does not suggest the existence of more than two modes in the distribution of export intensity in any country in our
data.
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distribution was generally unimodal, with a majority of exporters selling a small share of their
output abroad.
There are two important points that need to be made regarding the calculation of our dip test.
Firstly, since the WBES survey questionnaire asks directly ‘what percentage of the establishment’s
sales were exported’, the response to this question tends to cluster in figures that are multiples of
5%. Therefore, we adjust the dip statistic to take into account the discreteness of the data, since
not doing so would lead to over-rejecting the null hypothesis of unimodality. Secondly, since the
number of exporters varies substantially across countries, the dip statistic reported in Figure 2 is
calculated as the mean across 1,000 bootstrapped samples of 200 exporters in each country, which
allows us to directly compare the dip across countries.
Is the high prevalence of twin peaks in the distribution of export intensity a figment of the WBES
data? Asker et al. (2014), for instance, note that the stratification procedure across sectors, size
categories and geographic locations used in the construction of the WBES leads to an oversampling
of larger firms relative to a random sample of all firms in the economy. Although it is not clear that
this would necessarily increase the likelihood of observing bimodal export intensity distributions,
it is crucial for our purposes to show that twin peaks also appear in more representative datasets.
To this end, we asked fellow researchers to calculate for us the share of exporters across export
intensity bins using well-known firm-level manufacturing surveys for a sub-sample of 13 countries
in our data.10 The countries that we consider include 5 that we classify as unimodal based on
the dip statistic (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia and South Africa) and 8 bimodal (China,
Hungary, India, Ireland, Pakistan, Thailand, Uruguay and Vietnam). Most surveys used in our
analysis include all manufacturing firms with more than 10 to 20 employees, although the data
for China and Ireland is based on a survey of larger firms. It is also important to note that the
distribution of export intensity based on manufacturing surveys is calculated with data for a single
year, whereas —as we have noted above— the data we use pools exporters from all survey waves
available for a given country in the WBES.
Table 3 presents the comparison between the distribution of export intensity based on man-
ufacturing surveys and the one based on WBES data. The key message is that the WBES data
provides an accurate picture of the distribution export intensity. Both data sources yield simi-
lar results with regards to the existence or not of twin peaks —even in the cases in which there
are significant differences in the share of exporters in individual bins (e.g. in Hungary and India).
Crucially, note that in all countries but one, the share of exporters with export intensity in the
middle bins (where export intensity is between 0.2 and 0.8) is higher in the WBES than in the
more representative data. Thus, if anything, it seems that we are underestimating the prevalence
of twin peaks by relying on the WBES data.
10The choice of these countries was driven by data availability. The manufacturing survey data that we rely upon
for the comparison has been used in a large number of prominent papers in international trade, including —but not
limited to— Bustos (2011) (Argentina), Alvarez and Lo´pez (2005) (Chile), Feenstra and Hanson (2005) (China),
Roberts and Tybout (1997) (Colombia), Be´ke´s and Murako¨zy (2012) (Hungary), Goldberg et al. (2010) (India),
Javorcik and Poelhekke (2017) (Indonesia), Ali et al. (2017) (Pakistan), Mamburu (2017) (South Africa), Cole et al.
(2010) (Thailand), Casacuberta and Gandelman (2012) (Uruguay) and Ha and Kiyota (2014) (Vietnam).
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Table 3: Comparison of Export Intensity Distributions —WBES vs Other Surveys
Country Survey # Share of Exporters with Export Intensity P:
Exporters p0.0, 0.2s p0.2, 0.4s p0.4, 0.6s p0.6, 0.8s p0.8, 1.0s
Argentina ENIT 830 0.660 0.123 0.071 0.065 0.081
WBES 1,140 0.535 0.225 0.102 0.067 0.071
Chile ENIA 900 0.582 0.116 0.113 0.093 0.096
WBES 1,001 0.490 0.186 0.098 0.065 0.162
China NBS 50,902 0.221 0.101 0.091 0.101 0.486
WBES 1,439 0.282 0.198 0.116 0.093 0.311
Colombia EAM 1,332 0.643 0.157 0.068 0.038 0.095
WBES 703 0.459 0.273 0.128 0.067 0.073
Hungary APEH 7,143 0.488 0.127 0.081 0.079 0.225
WBES 300 0.243 0.207 0.160 0.123 0.267
India Prowess 3,133 0.576 0.136 0.088 0.071 0.129
WBES 2,212 0.260 0.214 0.116 0.072 0.338
Indonesia Census 3,949 0.124 0.097 0.089 0.127 0.563
WBES 720 0.125 0.172 0.144 0.139 0.419
Ireland FAME 151 0.371 0.093 0.079 0.099 0.358
WBES 173 0.330 0.155 0.113 0.082 0.320
Pakistan FRBP 6,043 0.207 0.056 0.041 0.043 0.652
WBES 534 0.148 0.146 0.109 0.062 0.536
South Africa SARS-NT 7,530 0.844 0.076 0.036 0.025 0.019
WBES 558 0.529 0.279 0.113 0.020 0.060
Thailand OIE 1,591 0.302 0.136 0.111 0.121 0.331
WBES 1,066 0.147 0.151 0.134 0.141 0.427
Uruguay EAAE 389 0.424 0.131 0.090 0.095 0.260
WBES 467 0.328 0.173 0.105 0.103 0.291
Vietnam ASE 4,946 0.292 0.108 0.094 0.115 0.391
WBES 1,251 0.173 0.128 0.065 0.104 0.530
Argentina: National Survey on Innovation and Technological Behavior of Industrial Argentinean Firms (ENIT) for
the year 2001; this is a representative sample of establishments with more than 10 employees. Chile: Annual National
Industrial Survey (ENIA) for the year 2000, covering the universe of Chilean manufacturing plants with 10 or more
workers. Colombia: Annual Manufacturing Survey (EIA) for they year 1991, covering the universe of Colombian
manufacturing plants with 10 or more workers. China: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) Manufacturing Survey
for the year 2003, which includes state-owned enterprises and private firms with sales above 5 million Chinese Yuan.
Hungary: universe of manufacturing firms for the year 2014 drawn from APEH, the Hungarian tax authority. India:
Prowess database collected by the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE) for the year 2001. Indonesia:
Indonesian Census of Manufacturing Firms for the year 2009, which surveys all registered manufacturing plants with
more than 20 employees. Ireland: FAME database collected by Bureau van Dijk for the year 2007. Pakistan: export
intensity is constructed from two administrative datasets from the Federal Board of Revenue of Pakistan (FBRP);
export figures are from customs records and domestic Sales from VAT data records. The data records all firms with
annual turnover above 2.5 million Pakistani rupees for the year 2013. South Africa: South African Revenue Service
and National Treasury Firm-Level Panel (SARS-NT) for the year 2010, which covers the universe of all tax registered
firms. Thailand: Annual Survey of Thailand’s manufacturing industries by the Office of Industrial Economics (OIE)
for the year 2014. The questionnaire’s response rate is about 60% of all firms accounting for about 95% of total
manufacturing. Uruguay: Annual Survey of Economic Activity (EAAE), which covers all manufacturing plants with
10 or more employees for the year 2005. Vietnam: Annual Survey on Enterprises (ASE) for the year 2010, which
covers all state-owned enterprises and foreign-owned firms and domestic private firms with more than 10 employees.
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3 Theoretical Framework
Consider a monopolistically-competitive industry in which each firm produces a unique, differen-
tiated good indexed by ω (which will also denote a firm’s identity hereafter). Firms can sell their
output domestically (d), or export it to the rest of the world (x). Firm ω’s sales in destination
market i P td, xu, ripωq, are given by:
ripωq “ Ai ¨ zipωq ¨ pipωq1´σ, (1)
where pipωq is the price charged by firm ω in market i, σ ą 1 is the elasticity of demand, Ai is
a measure of market i’s size —which is common to all firms selling there— and zipωq is a firm-
destination-specific revenue shifter.11 Our choice for the underlying distribution of revenue shifters
(lognormal, gamma or Fre´chet) is driven both by their wide usage to model economic heterogeneity
and, as noted below, the need for a closed-form expression for the pdf of the ratio of revenue
shifters.12
Recent work has shown that idiosyncratic, destination-specific factors, such as cross-country
differences in tastes, the extent of a firm’s network of customers or its participation in global value
chains are important drivers of firms’ export decisions (Eaton et al., 2011; Demidova et al., 2012;
Crozet et al., 2012). In fact, empirical evidence for Bangladeshi, Danish, French and Irish exporters
has consistently found that firm-destination fixed effects account for a similar share of the variation
in export sales as firm-specific factors such as productivity (see respectively, Kee and Krishna
(2008), Munch and Nguyen (2014), Eaton et al. (2011), and Lawless and Whelan (2014)).
As is standard in international trade models with heterogenous firms, producers pay a sunk
cost fe to draw their idiosyncratic productivity, ϕ, from a distribution with probability density
function (pdf), gpϕq.13 Firms draw their idiosyncratic revenue shifter in market i, zipωq, from a
distribution with pdf fpziq. We assume that the distribution fp¨q is the same in both markets,
although its parameters can, in some cases, differ across destinations; furthermore, revenue shifters
and productivity are assumed to be orthogonal with respect to each other. Firms incur a fixed cost
fd to set up a plant and produce their respective good using a linear technology, with labor being
the only input. Thus, the marginal cost of production for a firm of productivity ϕ, is w{ϕ, where
11The revenue function (1) obtains when there is a representative consumer in each country with CES preferences of
the form: U “
”ř
iPtd,xu
´ş
ωPΩi rzipωq
1
σ´1 qipωqsσ´1σ dω
¯ı σ
σ´1
, where qipωq denotes the quantity of good ω from country
i consumed, and Ωi is the set of varieties produced in market i available to consume. Under this interpretation, market
i’s size is given by Ai ” RiPσ´1i , where Ri denotes country i’s aggregate expenditure and Pi is the ideal price index
prevailing in the same country.
12The lognormal distribution has recently become a popular alternative to model the distribution of firm-level
productivity in international trade (see e.g. Head et al., 2014; Mra´zova´ et al., 2015; Nigai, 2017); Hanson et al.
(2016) find that the distribution of export capabilities at the industry level is also well approximated by a lognormal
distribution. Both Eaton et al. (2011) and Fernandes et al. (2015) use the lognormal distribution to model firm-
destination-specific revenue shifters in models with more than two destination markets. Luttmer (2007) uses the
gamma distribution to model the size distribution of firms, while Eaton and Kortum (2002) is the seminal reference
on the use of the Fre´chet distribution to model cross-country differences in productivity.
13All fixed costs are denominated in units of labor.
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w is the wage prevailing in the domestic market. A firm that chooses to export needs to incur an
additional fixed cost, fx, and an iceberg transport cost, τ ě 1.
Remark. We assume that firms choose whether to operate or not and what markets to serve after
observing their productivity, but before knowing the realization of revenue shifters.
We get a lot of mileage from this assumption.14 As will become clearer below, it allow us
to derive the pdf of export intensity only requiring knowledge of the distribution of the ratio of
relative revenue shifters. Moreover, we will also show that when revenue shifters are distributed
lognormal, gamma or Fre´chet, we can back out the relative market size sd{sx directly from the data
without having to solve the full model in general equilibrium. If, on the other hand, firms made the
decision to export after observing both their productivity and revenue shifters, then the distribution
of export intensity would depend on the joint distribution of these variables and the truncation
caused by the fixed cost of exporting;15 Defever and Rian˜o (2017a) calibrate the distribution of
export intensity in the latter type of model.
A firm that is productive enough to export,16 sets prices pdpωq “ σσ´1 wϕ and pxpωq “ τpdpωq at
home and abroad respectively (since revenue shifters are multiplicative, they do not affect prices).
Sales in market i P td, xu are given by:
ripωq “ Φpωq ¨ si ¨ zipωq, (2)
where sd ”
`
σ´1
σ
˘σ´1
w1´σAd, sx ”
`
σ´1
σ
˘σ´1
w1´στ1´σAx, and Φpωq ” ϕσ´1. Thus, sales in a
given destination i are composed of three terms: si encompasses all variables that are common across
all firms selling in i (i.e. market i’s size, home’s wage, transport costs), Φpωq (productivity), varies
across firms but is the same across destinations, and zipωq represents the factors that determine
the appeal of firm ω’s product specifically in market i.
Define an exporting firm’s export intensity as the share of total sales accounted for by exports.
Let Epωq be the random variable denoting the export intensity of firm ω, while lowercase e denotes
a realization of this random variable. Thus, the export intensity for firm ω is given by:
Epωq ” rxpωq
rdpωq ` rxpωq “
sxzxpωq
sdzdpωq ` sxzxpωq “
Zxpωq
Zdpωq ` Zxpωq . (3)
Since firms can only sell their output in two destinations, and charge the same constant markup in
both, it follows that export intensity is independent of productivity. Thus, in the absence of firm-
14This timing assumption has also been used by Cherkashin et al. (2015); it is consistent with the fact that while
firm-level productivity strongly predicts export entry, it explains much less of the variation in sales across destinations
conditional on entry (Eaton et al., 2011).
15Under this assumption the decision to export is characterized by a downward-sloping relationship in the
productivity-export revenue shifter pϕ, zxq space instead of a standard productivity cutoff. That is, for a given
level of productivity, only firms with sufficiently high foreign demand choose to export; similarly, for a given value of
the export revenue shifter, only the most productive firms sell some of their output abroad.
16That is, a firm for which the expected profit of exporting exceeds the fixed cost wfx.
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destination-specific revenue shifters, all exporters would have the same export intensity —namely,
τ1´σAx
Ad`τ1´σAx .
17 Therefore, heterogeneity in sales at the firm-destination level is a necessary feature
for our model to be able to reproduce the within-country variation in export intensity that we
observe in the data.
We now derive expressions for the pdf of export intensity when revenue shifters are distributed
lognormal, gamma and Fre´chet. We do so by relying on the method of transformations for random
variables. This approach requires two conditions: firstly, the distribution of revenue shifters has to
be closed under scalar multiplication. This implies that the ‘total’ revenue shifters, Zdpωq ” sdzdpωq
and Zxpωq ” sxzxpωq, follow the same distribution as the firm-destination-specific components
tzipωquiPtd,xu. Secondly, since E can be expressed as a strictly increasing function of the ratio of
export to domestic revenue shifters, Z ” Zx{Zd, we need this random variable to have a closed-form
pdf. With these conditions at hand, we can establish our first result:
Proposition 1. Assume that firm-destination-specific revenue shifters tzipωquiPtd,xu are drawn from
the same distribution independently across destinations.
(i) When revenue shifters are distributed lognormal (LN ) with underlying mean 0 and variance
σ2zi, i.e. when zipωq „ LN
`
0, σ2zi
˘
, and therefore, Zipωq ” sizipωq „ LN
`
lnpsiq, σ2zi
˘
, then
the probability density function of export intensity is given by:
hLN peq “ 1
rep1´ eqs
b
2pipσ2zd ` σ2zxq
ˆ exp
»—–´
´
ln
´
e
1´e
¯
´ ln
´
sx
sd
¯¯2
2pσ2zd ` σ2zxq
fiffifl , e P p0, 1q. (4)
(ii) When revenue shifters are distributed gamma (Γ) with scale parameter 1 and shape parameter
α ą 0, i.e. when zipωq „ Γp1, αq, and therefore, Zipωq ” sizipωq „ Γpsi, αq, then, the
probability density function of export intensity is given by:
hΓpeq “
´
sd
sx
¯α
Bpα, αq ˆ
eα´1p1´ eq´p1`αq”
1`
´
sd
sx
¯´
e
1´e
¯ı2α , e P p0, 1q, (5)
where Bp¨, ¨q denotes the Beta function.
(iii) When revenue shifters are distributed Fre´chet with scale parameter 1 and shape parameter
α ą 0, i.e. when zipωq „ Fre´chet p1, αq, and therefore, Zipωq ” sizipωq „ Fre´chet psi, αq, then,
17If firms could sell their output in more than two countries (paying a fixed cost per destination), then the more
productive producers would export to more markets and would have a higher export intensity than less productive ones
—even without firm-destination-specific revenue shifters. The prediction that firms enter export markets according
to a strict, productivity-driven hierarchy, however, is strongly rejected by the data (Eaton et al., 2011; Fernandes
et al., 2015). Also, as we noted in the introduction, this model would not be able to generate neither right-skewed
nor bimodal export intensity distributions if it were to be consistent with the stylized facts that characterize the size
distribution of firms.
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the probability density function of export intensity is given by:
hFre´chetpeq “ α
ˆ
sd
sx
˙α
ˆ e
α´1p1´ eq´p1`αq”
1`
´
sd
sx
¯α ´
e
1´e
¯αı2 , e P p0, 1q. (6)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Figures A.1-A.3 in Appendix A.1 provide examples of the pdf of export intensity for each
underlying distribution of revenue shifters and different values of their shape and scale parameters.
Two remarks are in order in regards to the distributions (4)-(6). Firstly, note that when revenue
shifters are distributed gamma or Fre´chet, we have assumed that the shape parameter α is the same
in the domestic and export market, whereas in the lognormal case the variance of revenue shifters
can vary across markets. Imposing this assumption allows us to prove Proposition 3 for gamma-
distributed shifters, while for the case of Fre´chet, we need it to obtain a closed-form expression for
the cdf of the ratio of revenue shifters (Nadarajah and Kotz, 2006). Secondly, when revenue shifters
are lognormal, export intensity follows a so-called logit-normal distribution with scale parameter
ln psx{sdq and variance σ2zd`σ2zx; Johnson (1949) derives the main properties of this distribution.18
We now move to describe the conditions under which the distribution of export intensity is
bimodal. These are spelled out in our second proposition:
Proposition 2. The distribution of export intensity is bimodal if:
• Revenue shifters are distributed lognormal, and the following two conditions are satisfied:
σ2zd ` σ2zx ą 2, (7)
and
|lnpsd{sxq| ă
`
σ2zd ` σ2zx
˘d
1´ 2
σ2zd ` σ2zx
´ 2 tanh´1
˜d
1´ 2
σ2zd ` σ2zx
¸
. (8)
The two modes lie in the interior of the support but do not have a closed-form solution. The
major mode is located near 0 when sd{sx ą 1, and near 1 in the converse case; if sd{sx “ 1,
then the distribution is symmetric around 0.5.
• Revenue shifters are distributed gamma or Fre´chet and α ă 1. In this case, the modes are
located at 0 and 1. The distribution of export intensity is unimodal when α ě 1. The major
mode occurs at 0 when sd{sx ą 1, and at 1 in the converse case; if sd{sx “ 1, then the
distribution is symmetric around 0.5.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
18X is a logit-normal random variable if Y “ logitpXq “ X{p1´Xq is normally distributed. We thank Chris Jones
for pointing this fact to us.
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The dispersion of sales in a market increases when σ2zd`σ2zx increases in the case of lognormally-
distributed revenue shifters, or when the shape parameter α falls in the case of the gamma or
Fre´chet distributions. Since revenue shifters are independent across destinations, the likelihood
that firms face a very high demand in only one of the two markets they serve also increases. When
the dispersion of revenue shifters is sufficiently high —i.e. when the conditions in Proposition 2
are satisfied— the distribution of export intensity exhibits twin peaks. That is, the majority of
exporters sell either a very small share or most of their output abroad. When the dispersion in
revenue shifters increases, twin peaks become more prominent as the mass of the distribution shifts
towards the boundaries of the support. While there is no closed-form solution for the modes when
revenue shifters are lognormal, Figure A.4 in Appendix A.2.1 shows that they are near 0 and 1,
and that they move closer to the extremes as the variance of revenue shifters increases.
Although the critical value of the shape parameter necessary to produce bimodality is the same
in the gamma and Fre´chet cases, there is a crucial difference between these two distributions. Bi-
modality obtains with Fre´chet shifters only when their dispersion is so large that their expected
value tends to infinite.19 This is problematic in monopolistic competition because in these circum-
stances the integrals defining the price index and the free-entry condition do not converge. This is
not an issue for lognormal and gamma-distributed shifters because all the moments of these random
variables are finite.20
It is important to note that the bimodality of export intensity can also arise when revenue
shifters follow distributions other than the three we consider in this paper. A notable example
is the Pareto distribution —perhaps the most ubiquitous distribution in the international trade
literature. Using simulations, we find that when revenue shifters are distributed Pareto with a
shape parameter lower than 1, the distribution of export intensity is multi-modal (it can have 2
or 3 modes); unfortunately, Ali et al. (2010) show that the distribution of the ratio of two Pareto-
distributed random variables does not admit a closed-form expression.21
Implications of Twin Peaks
In this section we discuss some instances in which twin peaks affect economic outcomes. First, we
show that when the distribution of export intensity exhibits twin peaks, trade liberalization leads to
the rise of high-intensity exporters. Then, we show that twin peaks also reduce the diversification
benefits of exporting.
Reduction in Trade Costs. A reduction in the iceberg cost faced by home exporters directly
19This is the case because the moment of order q for Fre´chet-distributed random variables is finite if and only if
α ą q.
20Since a gamma random variable with shape parameter 1 is distributed exponentially, it follows that twin peaks
arise if the gamma-distributed revenue shifters have dispersion greater than that of the exponential distribution.
21Other examples of distributions that generate a bimodal export intensity distribution are the beta, chi-squared
and F distributions. Just as in the case of Pareto, there is no closed-form expression for the pdf of the ratio of these
random variables.
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lowers the ratio sd{sx.22 Figure 3 shows how the distribution of export intensity changes as the
relative size of the foreign market increases (when moving from Panel I on the left to Panel III
on the right). The darker line shows the distribution of export intensity when revenue shifters are
lognormal and the sum of their variances is equal to 4 —thus, producing a bimodal distribution—
while the lighter line represents a unimodal distribution (i.e. when σ2zd ` σ2zd “ 1).
Figure 3: Reduction in Export Costs with and without Twin Peaks
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The figure plots the probability density function of export intensity when revenue shifters are lognormal with σ2zd `
σ2zd “ 4 (darker line) and σ2zd ` σ2zd “ 1 (lighter line) for different values of the ratio of scale parameters; namely,
sd{sx “ 0.1 in Panel I, 0.5 in Panel II and 1.5 in Panel III.
In panel I of Figure 3, trade costs are so high that most exporters sell only a small share of their
output abroad regardless of the level of dispersion in revenue shifters, and therefore, the two ex-
port intensity distributions look quite similar.23 As trade costs fall, the intensity of all exporters
increases and the distribution of export intensity shifts to the right. However, the difference in
the distribution with and without twin peaks also becomes starker. When the variance of revenue
shifters is sufficiently large to generate twin peaks, greater access to foreign markets increases the
prevalence of high-intensity exporters; conversely, when the dispersion is unimodal, the increase in
the intensity of exporters following liberalization is gradual.
Exports and Firm-level Volatility. A recent literature investigates how exporting affects firm-
level volatility (see e.g. Rian˜o, 2011; Vannoorenberghe, 2012; Kurz and Senses, 2016; Girma et al.,
2016). In principle, exporting allows firms to diversify demand shocks that are not perfectly corre-
lated across markets, thereby lowering the volatility of sales.
We now show that the existence of twin peaks in the distribution of export intensity reduces the
22If both countries are symmetric in size and the reduction in trade costs is bilateral, this direct effect coincides with
the full general equilibrium change in relative market size. More generally, a lower trade cost also affects wages and
price indices in both countries. Demidova and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2013) show that is not possible to unambiguously sign
the effect of trade liberalization on wages and price indices in the Melitz (2003) model when countries are asymmetric
in terms of size unless the model is parameterized and fully solved.
23To fix ideas, assume that the foreign country is twice as large as home, i.e. Ax{Ad “ 2. Then, a sd{sx ratio of
0.1 (Panel I) implies an iceberg cost of 4.47 (given σ “ 3). Based on the same parametrization, the iceberg cost in
Panels II and III are 2 and 1.15 respectively.
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diversification benefits of exporting. To do so, we introduce a minor modification to the revenue
functions defined in (2). We assume that aggregate variables, productivity and firm-destination-
specific revenue shifters are time-invariant, but sales vary over time in response to idiosyncratic
i.i.d. demand shocks, itpωq, which are drawn from a distribution with mean 1 and variance ν2i
—the same set up considered by Vannoorenberghe (2012). Thus, firm ω’s sales in market i P td, xu
in period t are given by:
ritpωq “ Φpωq ¨ si ¨ zipωq ¨ itpωq. (9)
Since shocks are multiplicative and transitory, the firm chooses the same optimal prices as in the
static model described before, and therefore, Epωq “ ZxpωqZdpωq`Zxpωq —the same expression as (3)—
now denotes firm ω’s long-run export intensity.
Assuming that demand shocks are equally volatile across markets, it can be shown that firms’
volatility is minimized when the firm’s long-run export intensity equal 0.5.24 If the distribution of
long-run export intensity displays twin peaks, a greater dispersion of revenue shifters increases the
share of firms with export intensity close to 0 and 1. As a result, the aggregate volatility-reduction
effect of exporting is weakened because most exporters sell the majority of their output either
domestically or abroad.
4 Estimation
In the previous section we showed that the distribution of export intensity is fully characterized by
the shape parameter governing the distribution of firm-destination-specific revenue shifters and a
country’s relative size with respect to the rest of the world. We now discuss how we estimate these
parameters using the cross-country firm-level data from the WBES.
Identification Strategy. We first present a result that greatly facilitates the identification and
estimation of the parameters governing the distribution of revenue shifters. Namely,
Proposition 3. If revenue shifters are independent across firms and destinations and follow either
lognormal, gamma, or Fre´chet distributions as specified in Proposition 1, then the median export
intensity, emed, is given by:
emed “ sx
sd ` sx , (10)
which is independent of the shape parameter of revenue shifters.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
24In Appendix B we show that the volatility of the growth rate of total sales for firm ω, Volpωq, is given by:
Volpωq « 2 “p1´ Epωqq2 ¨ ν2d ` pEpωqq2 ¨ ν2x‰ .
The volatility of sales is therefore minimized when the firm’s long-run export intensity is equal to
ν2x
ν2
d
`ν2x . Assuming ag-
nostically that demand shocks are equally volatile across markets, the latter expression implies that the diversification
effect of exporting is maximized when a firm’s long-run export intensity is 0.5.
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Thus, Proposition 3 allows us to recover the relative market size for each country directly from
the export intensity data by inverting equation (10):ˆ
sd
sx
˙
“ 1´ e
med
emed
. (11)
It also follows from (11) that our measure of relative market size is invariant to the underlying
distribution of revenue shifters. Crucially, Proposition 3 allows us to recover relative market sizes
without having to estimate or calibrate other parameters of the model such as trade costs, or the
parameters characterizing the productivity distribution, all of which are necessary to compute the
value of si when solving the model explicitly.
Conditional on relative market size, the identification of the shape parameter is straightforward.
The value of this parameter is determined by whether the mass of the export intensity distribution
is concentrated in the interior or near the boundaries of the support. If the dispersion of revenue
shifters is low, then the distribution of export intensity is unimodal, with most exporters exhibiting
an intensity close to sxsd`sx . On the other hand, if there large clusters of exporters with intensities
near 0 and 1, then the dispersion of revenue shifters will be sufficiently high so that the shape
parameter satisfies the conditions spelled out in Proposition 2.
Scale Parameters. Figure 4 displays the distribution of the median export intensity in our data.
Although there is large variation across countries, the median export intensity ranges between 0.2
and 0.8 for most of them. In the lower end of the distribution, Brazil and Russia have a median
export intensity of 0.1, while at the other extreme, Bangladesh, Madagascar, Morocco, Pakistan,
Philippines and Sri Lanka all have a median export intensity greater than 0.9. Summary statistics
for the relative country size implied by countries’ median export intensity are reported in Table 4.
For the median country in our sample, the domestic market is 50% larger than the foreign market.
Figure 4: Distribution of Median Export Intensity Across Countries
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Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES), 2002-2016.
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Table 4: Inferred Relative Domestic Market Size
Mean Percentile
5 25 50 75 95
xsd
sx
1.967 0.010 0.667 1.500 2.333 5.667
Country-Specific Shape Parameters. We first estimate country-specific shape parameters for
each of the three revenue-shifter distributions that we consider. These are estimated by maximum
likelihood conditional on relative market size being given by (11). Our objective is to determine
whether the conditions for bimodality of the export intensity distribution that we identified in
Proposition 2 bear out in the data. With our estimates at hand we then use the Vuong (1989) test
to compare the resulting distributions in terms of their fit to the data. Vuong (1989) proposes a
likelihood-ratio (LR) based statistic based on the Kullback-Leibler information criterion to measure
the closeness of a model to the true data generating process.25 This test has two desirable properties
for our purposes: first, it can be used to compare non-nested econometric models —in particular
those that are obtained from different families of distributions, as in our case. Second, the test is
directional —i.e. it indicates which competing model is better when the null hypothesis that two
models are indistinguishable from each other is rejected.
It is important to note that the export intensity pdfs we derive are not defined at an export
intensity of 1 —in other words, they do not admit firms exporting all their output. Since ‘pure
exporters’ are ubiquitous in the data, we need to censor their export intensity, and we do so at
a conservative value of 0.99. Increasing the censoring cutoff biases the shape parameter in the
direction of bimodality (i.e. lowers the shape parameter for gamma and Fre´chet and increases the
sum of variances in the lognormal case). This is the case because the distribution of revenue shifters
would need to generate large shares of extremely low and high realizations to be able to reproduce a
significant number of exporters with intensity at or above the censoring threshold.26 To ensure that
our results are not driven by our chosen censoring threshold, we re-estimate the shape parameter
dropping all pure exporters in the robustness analysis in the next section.
The country-specific shape parameter estimates are reported in Table C.1 in Appendix C. In
all but a handful of cases they imply export intensity distributions that are bimodal. The mean
estimates across countries are 6.489 for lognormal and 0.672 and 0.740 for gamma and Fre´chet-
distributed revenue shifters respectively. In the lognormal case, all shape parameters satisfy con-
ditions (7) and (8) for bimodality (see Figure A.5 in Appendix A.2.1). When revenue shifters are
distributed gamma or Fre´chet, we estimate shape parameters greater than 1 for 6 and 7 countries
respectively —all of which are identified as unimodal by the dip test reported in Figure 2.
25Mra´zova´ et al. (2015) also use the Kullback-Leibler divergence to evaluate how different combinations of demand
functions and productivity distributions fit the size distribution of French firms exporting to Germany.
26For instance, for a firm to have an export intensity of 0.99, its export revenue shifter has to be 99 times larger
than its domestic one; increasing the censoring threshold to 0.999 would shift this ratio up by an order of magnitude.
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The results of the Vuong (1989) test reported in columns (1)-(3) and (7)-(9) of Table D.1 in
Appendix D do not suggest that one of the underlying distributions of revenue shifters clearly dom-
inates the others in terms of fitting the data. Comparing the lognormal-based export intensity with
the gamma and Fre´chet distributions reveals that in 20 countries we cannot discriminate between
the two competing models, while the remaining ones are evenly split between the lognormal and
the competing distribution. Among the set of countries for which lognormal performs worse than
the alternative, gamma fits the data better than Fre´chet in all but two countries.27
Single Shape Parameter. The results discussed above show that large heterogeneity in firms’
performance across domestic and export markets can successfully explain the occurrence of twin
peaks. We now investigate if our model can account for the variation we observe in the distribution
of export intensity across countries. Putting it differently, can our model explain the patterns
depicted in Figure 1?
To answer this question we consider a scenario in which firms in all countries draw revenue
shifters in each destination they serve from a distribution with the same shape parameter. This
implies that the variation in the distribution of export intensity across countries is entirely due to
differences in relative market size. In order to estimate this ‘restricted’ model, we pool data across
all countries and weight each observation by the inverse of the number of observations available for
each country.
The estimates for the single-shape parameter models are reported in Table 5. The point-
estimates are very similar to the average across the country-specific estimates reported above and
all imply a bimodal distribution of export intensity. Notably, the Vuong test reveals that for
approximately two-thirds of the countries we cannot discriminate between the restricted model and
the one where shape parameters are country-specific (see columns (4)-(6) and (10)-(12) of Table
D.1 in Appendix D), even though the latter fits the data better by definition. The restricted model
has the additional advantage that it greatly facilitates conducting the robustness analysis below in
which we investigate whether the existence of a second mode near 1 is driven by specific subsets of
firms being particularly export intensive.
Using customs-level data from France and the World Bank’s Export Dynamics Database, Eaton
et al. (2011) and Fernandes et al. (2015) estimate structural models of trade that incorporate
lognormally-distributed firm-destination-specific revenue shifters. Although their models are richer
than ours —including, for instance, shocks to productivity and fixed costs and convex marketing
costs— they both find that the variance of revenue shifters is large enough to generate bimodality
in our model.28
27When the Vuong test indicates that lognormal dominates gamma it also suggests that the former provides a
better fit to the data than Fre´chet. The only exception is in the case of Uganda in which the test rejects gamma in
favor of lognormal but cannot discriminate between lognormal and Fre´chet.
28Eaton et al. estimate this parameter at 2.856, while Fernandes et al. find it to be 6.60. In comparison, if we
assume agnostically that the variance of domestic and export shifters is the same, the point estimate reported in
column (1) of Table 5 implies a value of 3.24.
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Table 5: Single Shape Parameter Estimate
Distribution: Lognormal Gamma Fre´chet
Parameter: σ2zd ` σ2zx α α
(1) (2) (3)
Estimate: 6.489 0.623 0.702
(0.050) (0.004) (0.003)
Countries 72 72 72
Obs. 33,224 33,224 33,224
The table reports the maximum likelihood estimate of the shape param-
eter governing firm-destination-specific revenue shifters for different un-
derlying distributions, conditional on sx{sd being given by (11). The
pdf used in the estimation are given by equations (4), (5), and (6), for
lognormal, gamma and Fre´chet distributed revenue shifters respectively.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Figure 5 presents the fit of the three restricted models to the data, with countries sorted
according to their estimated relative market size. Relying only on variation in countries’ relative
market size and a unique shape parameter governing firm-destination revenue shifters, our model
reproduces closely the wide range of shapes observed in the distribution of export intensity across
the world: unimodal distributions where the majority of exporters exhibit either very low or very
high export intensity, just as well as those displaying twin peaks. Figure 5 also echoes the results
of the Vuong test discussed above —all three distributions of revenue shifters, lognormal, gamma
and Fre´chet, fit the export intensity data quite well.
Relative Country Size and Bimodality
We have established that when the conditions in Proposition 2 are satisfied, the distribution of
export intensity is bimodal. Nevertheless, Figure 2 shows that one-third of the countries in our
sample have a unimodal distribution. These two are reconciled in our model by noting that as
relative market size either becomes too small or too large, the height of the minor mode shrinks
enough for the distribution to appear unimodal. In these circumstances, a statistical test of uni-
modality, such as the dip test, is likely to not reject the null hypothesis of unimodality. That is,
the probability that the test produces a Type-II error increases.
Figure 6 plots the dip statistic calculated for data simulated using the shape parameters reported
in Table 5 for different values of the median export intensity. Figure 6 shows that there is an
inverse-U relationship between the dip statistic (recall that a larger number means that the dis-
tribution is less likely to be unimodal) and the median export intensity. Countries that are either
very small or very large relative to the rest of the world —which have very high and low median
export intensities respectively— are likely to be classified as unimodal by the dip test (dashed lines
in Figure 6); conversely, countries for which the domestic and export markets are more similar in
size display more prominent twin peaks.
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Figure 6: Relative Market Size and Bimodality of the Export Intensity Distribution
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The figure reports the value of the dip test statistic calculated on simulated
export intensity draws using the estimated shape parameters reported in
Table 5 for different values of the median export intensity. Solid lines repre-
sent sets of draws in which the null hypothesis of unimodality is rejected at
the 1% significance level, while dashed lines show the realizations for which
unimodality is not rejected.
Figure 7: Prevalence of Bimodality and Median Export Intensity across Countries
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The figure plots the fitted values obtained after regressing ach country’s dip test statistic
(reported in Table 2) on a country’s median export intensity and median export intensity
squared. The estimated equation is dip “ 0.0086
p0.0096q
`0.2044
p0.0326q
median´0.1736
p0.0397q
median2, and
the shaded area denotes the 95% confidence interval. Hollow circles denote countries
for which the dip test does not reject the null hypothesis of unimodality at the 1%
level (unimodal) and filled circles indicate countries with a bimodal export intensity
distribution (those for which the p-value of the dip test is below 1%).
25
Figure 7 reveals that the inverted-U pattern is also clearly borne in the data. Thus, the high
dispersion in firm-destination-specific revenue shifters is able to explain why the distribution of
export intensity is bimodal in some countries but appears unimodal in others. Figure 5 shows that
relative country size clearly determines whether a country has uni- or bimodal distribution.
5 Robustness
An alternative explanation for the existence of twin peaks is that they are the product of a compo-
sition effect arising from certain groups of firms having markedly different export intensities. Thus,
in this section we probe the robustness of our single-shape-parameter estimates by excluding differ-
ent subsets of firms that the literature has identified as being more export-oriented than average.
These results are reported in columns (2)-(7) of Table 6 (column (1) reproduces our benchmark
single-shape parameters estimates for convenience). Notice that as we restrict the sample across dif-
ferent specifications, the median export intensity changes for each country relative to the estimates
presented in Figure 4.
Foreign Ownership. We start our analysis by excluding firms that are foreign-owned —i.e. those
with a share of foreign equity of at least 10%— from the estimation. As Antra`s and Yeaple (2014)
note, multinational firm affiliates tend to be more export intensive than non-multinational firms
because of intra-firm vertical specialization taking place between parent companies and affiliates.
Arnold and Javorcik (2009) find that the export intensity of Indonesian plants that are acquired
by foreign investors increases substantially after acquisition.
Export Processing. Firms engaged in export processing activities have also been identified as
being highly export intensive (see e.g. Brandt and Morrow, 2017). Export processing occurs when a
producer ships an unfinished product to a foreign country where some value-added is incorporated
into it before being re-exported again. Firms undertaking processing activities have high export
intensity because the tariff concessions available in this customs regime require firms to export all
goods that incorporate duty-free imported inputs. Although the WBES data does not identify firms
that export through a processing custom regime explicitly, we use the share of intermediate inputs
accounted for by imports to construct a proxy for export processing. Therefore, we classify firms
as processing exporters if their share of imported inputs exceeds 90% of their total expenditure in
intermediate inputs.
Pure Exporters. In our most stringent exercise, we exclude firms that export all their output
—‘pure exporters’— from the estimation. In the model we proposed in Section 3, we assumed that
all firms pay a fixed cost fd to set up a plant, and then, additionally, a fixed cost fx if they choose
to export. Therefore, all operating firms would sell a positive quantity of output —no matter how
small— in the domestic market. Alternatively, firms could face destination-specific fixed costs,
as in Eaton et al. (2011) for instance, that incorporate production and market access costs. In
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the latter model, firms with relatively low productivity but facing sufficiently high demand abroad
would choose to operate as pure exporters.
The results reported in columns (2)-(4) of Table 6 show that the estimated shape parameters
are extremely robust, and they all imply a bimodal distribution of export intensity. Excluding pure
exporters produces the largest reduction in the dispersion of revenue shifters as it directly affects
the export intensity distribution. The important thing, however, is that even when we exclude
these firms, which account for a substantial share of high-intensity exporters, our main result re-
mains unchanged. Having examined firm-level characteristics, we now turn to country-level factors
that could potentially generate bimodal export intensity distributions through a composition effect.
Subsidies with Export Share Requirements. The use of incentives subject to export share
requirements distorts a country’s ‘natural’ export intensity distribution because firms are induced
to operate at a higher export intensity than the one they would have chosen otherwise. Defever and
Rian˜o (2017a) show that this can produce large negative welfare effects in countries enacting them.
As we have noted in Section 2, approximately half of the countries in our data provide this class of
incentives. ESR are frequently imposed in special economic zones —geographically-bounded areas
in which customs, tax and investment regulations are more liberal than in the rest of the country
(Farole and Akinci, 2011; Defever et al., 2016). By excluding countries that offer subsidies with
ESR from our estimation we seek to allay the concern that the high prevalence of twin peaks across
the world is due to the use of these incentives.
Level of Development. Although our sample consists primarily of developing countries, we also
investigate if there are significant differences in the estimated shape parameter between OECD and
non-OECD countries. If, for instance, the high prevalence of high-intensity exporters is caused by
vertical specialization driven by cross-country wage differentials, then it could be the case that the
value of the shape parameter is influenced by the composition of countries in our sample.
The results presented in columns (5)-(7) of Table 6 show, once again, that the estimated shape
parameters imply bimodality. Excluding countries that provide subsidies with ESR, which are also
countries where high-intensity exporters are ubiquitous, has a similar effect on the shape parameter
as excluding foreign-owned and export processing firms. Consistent with the intuition outlined
above, the dispersion of revenue shifters is higher for developing countries than for developed ones.
Sectoral Differences. Bernard et al. (2007) document large differences in average export intensity
across manufacturing industries in the U.S. Thus, we now explore the possibility that a country’s
bimodal export intensity distribution is the result of a mixture of sectoral distributions, which may
differ substantially due to technological differences or comparative advantage. For this exercise we
include countries in which there are more than 50 exporters operating in a given sector. Since there
28
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is a significant degree of concentration of exporters across sectors and countries, these estimates
need to be considered with caution.29
Table 7 shows that the distribution of export intensity is bimodal even within industries. The
industry-specific parameters are similar in magnitude to estimates presented in Table 5. Only in
chemical & pharmaceutical products is the shape parameter near the limit necessary to generate
bimodality with gamma and Fre´chet shifters.
The key takeaway message from our robustness analysis is that, regardless of how you slice it,
the data strongly supports the bimodality of the distribution of export intensity.
Estimating Parameters using Sales Data
We now assume that firms’ productivity and revenue shifters —and therefore, their sales— are log-
normal and estimate the mean and variance of sales for each country-destination pair in our data.30
Letting zipωq „ LN
`
0, σ2zi
˘
, i P td, xu, and Φpωq „ LN `0, σ2Φ˘ and assuming that productivity
and revenue shifters are all independent from each other, it follows that,
ripωq „ LN
`
lnpsiq, σ2Φ ` σ2zi
˘
, i P td, xu. (12)
Estimating the parameters for the distribution of sales allows us to carry out two exercises: first,
we use the domestic and export scale parameters to calculate sxsd`sx , and compare it to the relative
market size obtained from the median export intensity. Second, we decompose the variance of sales
between firm- and firm-destination-specific factors utilizing the estimated variance of sales and the
sum of the variances of revenue shifters reported in Table C.1 in Appendix C.
Scale Parameters. Figure 8 plots the ratio sxsd`sx based on the estimated scale parameters for
domestic and export sales against each country’s median export intensity. With the exception of
a few countries —namely, those with median export intensity very close to 1— all countries lie
close to the 45 degree line. Thus, the transformation of median export intensity (11) provided by
Proposition 3 delivers sensible estimates of a country’s size relative to the rest of the world. Using
the relative market size based on sales data we obtain estimates of the shape parameter that are
almost identical to those reported in Table 5.
Variance Decomposition. Combining the estimates of σ2Φ`σ2zi with those of σ2zd`σ2zx obtained
from the export intensity data, we carry out a variance decomposition of sales. This entails solving
29One third of exporters in our sample sell textile garments & leather products, while food & beverages and metal
& machinery industries account for approximately 15% of exporters each. About half of Eastern European exporters
operate in the metals & machinery industry, while leather & textiles exporters account for more than 40% of exporters
in several Latin American and South and East Asian countries. As expected, richer countries have a more diversified
export base.
30These are estimated by maximum likelihood. To be consistent with the results based on export intensity data
reported before, we only include exporting firms in the estimation. We express both domestic and export sales of
firms across all countries in our sample in 2007 US dollars.
30
Figure 8: Scale Parameters Obtained by Fitting Domestic and Export Sales
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a system of three equations (one for the variance of export intensity and two for the variance of
sales in each market) and three unknowns, σ2zd, σ
2
zx, and σ
2
Φ. The share of the variance of sales in
each market accounted for by firm-destination-specific revenue shifters is given by:
Sharezi “ σ
2
zi
σ2Φ ` σ2zi
, i P td, xu. (13)
Table 8 reports the average of (13) across all countries. In our benchmark specification, firm-
destination-specific revenue shifters account for between 55 to 61 percent of the variation of sales.
These figures are consistent with high dispersion in firm-destination-specific generating twin peaks,
Table 8: Share of the Variance of Sales Accounted for Revenue Shifters
Full Excluding Countries
Sample Foreign Processing Pure Exp. without ESR OECD non-OECD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sharezd 0.553 0.548 0.519 0.291 0.501 0.376 0.585
Sharezx 0.611 0.613 0.588 0.381 0.586 0.504 0.630
The table reports the average across all countries of the share of the variance of sales in each market (domestic and
export) which is accounted for by firm-destination-specific factors (defined in equation (13)). The different subsamples
used in columns (2)-(7) are defined in Section 5.
31
and are also in line the empirical evidence based on customs data (Kee and Krishna, 2008; Eaton
et al., 2011; Munch and Nguyen, 2014; Lawless and Whelan, 2014). Columns (2)-(7) of Table
8 report the variance decomposition for the different subsamples considered in our robustness
analysis above. Our main message remains unchanged: firm-destination-specific factors account for
a substantial share of the variance of domestic and export sales.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that the distribution of export intensity varies considerably across
the world. While previous work suggested that this distribution was consistently unimodal, with
a majority of exporters selling most of their output domestically, we show that bimodal export
intensity distributions appear to be the rule rather than the exception.
We then show that with a single modification, the workhorse two-country model of trade with
CES preferences and heterogenous firms can very successfully reproduce the wide range of pat-
terns for the export intensity distribution that we observe in the data. The key is to incorporate
idiosyncratic firm-destination-specific revenue shifters drawn from a distribution with sufficiently
high dispersion into the model. If this is the case, we find that differences in relative market size
explain most of the observed cross-country variation in the distribution of export intensity.
Our findings open up exciting avenues for future research. It would be interesting to investigate
the evolution of the distribution of export intensity over time, and how this process responds to
changes in trade policy and technology. Our model suggests that the dynamics will depend crucially
on whether there are twin peaks or not. Another exciting line of inquiry would be to unpack the
underlying causes that explain the high level dispersion in the demand that the same firm faces
across different destinations.
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Twin Peaks
Appendix
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1.
We use the method of transformations for random variables (stated below) to derive the probability
density function of export intensity. Since export intensity is a monotone transformation of the
ratio of export to domestic revenue shifters in our model, we can use the method of transformations
to obtain the pdf of export intensity whenever there is a closed-form solution for the pdf of the
ratio of revenue shifters.
Theorem 1. Let Z be a continuous random variable with pdf fpzq, and let Z denote the support
of Z. Consider the random variable E “ jpZq, where e “ jpzq defines a one-to-one transformation
that maps the set Z onto the set E. Then the pdf of the random variable E “ jpZq is given by:
hpeq “
#
f rj´1peqs ¨ dde
`
j´1peq˘ , e P E ,
0 elsewhere.
(A.1)
Let E denote export intensity —the share of total revenues accounted for by exports. Then, we
have:
E “ Zx
Zd ` Zx “
´
Zx
Zd
¯
1`
´
Zx
Zd
¯ “ Z
1` Z Ñ jpZq “
Z
1` Z . (A.2)
Z “ j´1pEq “ E
1´ E . (A.3)
d
dE
`
j´1pEq˘ “ 1p1´ Eq2 ą 0. (A.4)
Thus, the pdf of export intensity is:
hpeq “ 1p1´ eq2 ¨
rf ˆ e
1´ e
˙
, e P p0, 1q, (A.5)
where rf ´ zxzd¯ denotes the pdf of the ratio of export to domestic revenue shifters.
A.1.1 Lognormal
Let the firm-destination-specific revenue shifter in market i in (1) be given by zipωq “ exprθipωqs,
with θipωq „ N p0, σ2ziq. This implies that zipωq „ LN p0, σ2ziq, or in other words, that ln zipωq is
normally-distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2zi, and therefore, that,
Zipωq “ si ¨ exprθipωqs „ LN
`
ln si, σ
2
zi
˘
, i P td, xu. (A.6)
Since the ratio of two lognormal random variables is also distributed lognormal, it follows that
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Z ” Zx{Zd „ LN
`
ln psx{sdq , σ2zd ` σ2zx
˘
. Thus, the pdf of Z is:
rfpzq “ 1
z
b
2pipσ2zd ` σ2zxq
exp
«
´pln z ´ lnpsx{sdqq
2
2pσ2zd ` σ2zxq
ff
, z ą 0. (A.7)
Applying Theorem 1 and using (A.7), we obtain the pdf for export intensity:
hLN peq “ 1
rep1´ eqs
b
2pipσ2zd ` σ2zxq
exp
»—–´
´
ln
´
e
1´e
¯
´ ln
´
sx
sd
¯¯2
2pσ2zd ` σ2zxq
fiffifl , e P p0, 1q. (A.8)
The distribution (A.8) is known as the logit-normal distribution (Johnson, 1949).
Figure A.1 presents some examples of the pdf of export intensity when revenue shifters are
distributed lognormal for different values of the relative scale parameter sd{sx and the sum of the
variance of revenue shifters σ2zd ` σ2zx.
Figure A.1: Pdf Export Intensity Distribution —Lognormal-Distributed Revenue Shifters
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A.1.2 Gamma
Coelho and Mexia (2007) show that the pdf of the ratio of two gamma-distributed random variables,
Z ” Zx{Zd with parameters pα, sxq and pα, sdq respectively, is given by:
rfpzq “
´
sd
sx
¯α
Bpα, αq
„
1`
ˆ
sd
sx
˙
z
´2α
zα´1, z ą 0, (A.9)
where α ą 0 denotes the shape parameter, sd ą 0 and sx ą 0 are respectively, the scale parameters
for the domestic and export market, and Bp¨, ¨q is the Beta function.
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Substituting (A.9) into (A.5), we obtain (after some simplification):
hγpeq “
´
sd
sx
¯α
Bpα, αq ˆ
eα´1p1´ eq´p1`αq”
1`
´
sd
sx
¯´
e
1´e
¯ı2α , e P p0, 1q. (A.10)
Figure A.2 presents some examples of the pdf of export intensity when revenue shifters are dis-
tributed gamma for different values of the relative scale parameter, sd{sx, and the shape parameter
of revenue shifters, α.
Figure A.2: Pdf Export Intensity Distribution —Gamma-Distributed Revenue Shifters
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A.1.3 Fre´chet
Nadarajah and Kotz (2006) show that the cdf of the ratio Z ” Zx{Zd of two Fre´chet distributions
with parameters pα, sxq and pα, sdq, is given by:
rF pzq “
”´
sd
sx
¯
z
ıα
1`
”´
sd
sx
¯
z
ıα , z ą 0. (A.11)
where, again, α ą 0 denotes the shape parameter and sd ą 0 and sx ą 0 are the scale parameters
for the domestic and export market.
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We can derive the cdf for export intensity as follows:
HFre´chetpeq ” ProbrE ď es “ Prob
„
Zx
Zd ` Zx ď e

,
“ Prob
„
Zx
Zd
ď e
1´ e

,
“ rF ˆ e
1´ e
˙
,
“
”´
sd
sx
¯´
e
1´e
¯ıα
1`
”´
sd
sx
¯´
e
1´e
¯ıα , e P p0, 1q. (A.12)
Taking the derivative of (A.12) yields the pdf of export intensity:
hFre´chetpeq ” dH
Fre´chetpeq
de
“
α
´
sd
sx
¯α
eα´1
p1´eqα`1
”
1`
”´
sd
sx
¯´
e
1´e
¯ıαı´ α´ sdsx¯2α e2α´1p1´eq2α`1”
1`
”´
sd
sx
¯´
e
1´e
¯ıαı2 ,
which, after some simplification, becomes:
hFre´chetpeq “ α
ˆ
sd
sx
˙α
ˆ e
α´1p1´ eq´p1`αq”
1`
´
sd
sx
¯α ´
e
1´e
¯αı2 , e P p0, 1q, (A.13)
Figure A.3 presents some examples of the pdf of export intensity when revenue shifters are dis-
tributed Fre´chet for different values of the relative scale parameter, sd{sx, and the shape parameter
of revenue shifters, α.
Figure A.3: Pdf Export Intensity Distribution —Fre´chet-Distributed Revenue Shifters
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 2.
A.2.1 Lognormal
As shown above, the export intensity follows a Logit-normal distribution when revenue shifters are
distributed lognormal. Johnson (1949) characterized the properties of the Logit-normal distribu-
tion, which is referred to in the paper as the System SB of frequency curves (see equation (23),
page 158).
The conditions for bimodality of the Logit-normal distribution are stated in equation (26) in
page 159. Translating the terms in our equation for the pdf of export intensity (4) to the notation
used by Johnson (1949), yields:
δ ” 1b
σ2zd ` σ2zx
, (A.14)
γ ” lnpsd{sxqb
σ2zd ` σ2zx
. (A.15)
Substituting (A.14) and (A.15) in equation (26) of Johnson (1949), yields equations (7) and (8).
The modes of the distribution can be found by taking the derivative of the log of the pdf (4)
with respect to e and set it equal to zero. Doing so, reveals that the modes of the export intensity
distribution solve:
ln
ˆ
e
1´ e
˙
“ ´ lnpsd{sxq `
`
σ2zd ` σ2zx
˘ p2e´ 1q , (A.16)
which does not have a closed-form solution. Figure A.4 plots the two modes of the export intensity
distribution as a function of the median export intensity, emed, and σ2zd` σ2zx. The modes are very
close to 0 and 1. For a given relative country size, a higher sum of the variance of revenue shifters
pushes the modes towards the extremes of the support; taking the dispersion of shifters as given,
increasing the median export intensity increases both modes.
Figure A.5 plots the solution to the equation
ˇˇˇ
lnp1´ emedq ´ lnpemedq
ˇˇˇ
“ `σ2zd ` σ2zx˘
d
1´ 2
σ2zd ` σ2zx
´ 2 tanh´1
˜d
1´ 2
σ2zd ` σ2zx
¸
, (A.17)
which describes the combination of median export intensity and the sum of the variance of revenue
shifters for which the distribution of export intensity is bimodal. Note that we have used Proposition
3 to express (A.17) in terms of the median export intensity rather than in terms of the ratio of
scale parameters.
What condition (A.17) tells us is that the minimum sum of variances necessary to induce
bimodality in the distribution of export intensity increases when a country’s median export intensity
gets closer to either 0 or 1. Figure A.5 also includes the country-specific estimated sum of revenue
shifter variances reported in columns (1) and (4) of Table C.1. Thus, it follows that all the estimated
shape parameters under lognormally-distributed revenue shifters imply a bimodal export intensity
distribution.
To establish how is the distribution of export intensity affected by changes in relative country
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Figure A.4: Export Intensity Modes —Lognormal-distributed Revenue Shifters
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The figure plots the two modes of the export intensity distribution (i.e. the solutions to equation
(A.16) as a function of the median export intensity (recall that sd{sx “ p1 ´ emedq{emed) and
σ2zd ` σ2zx when revenue shifters are distributed lognormal.
Figure A.5: Bimodality Condition for Lognormal-Distributed Revenue Shifters
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Median Export Intensity
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
d
<2 z
d
+
<2 z
x
ALB
ARG
ARM
BGD
BLR
BOLBIH
BRA
BGR
CHL
CHN
COL
CRI
HRV
CZE
ECU
EGY
SLV
EST
ETH MKD
GHA
GT
HND
HUN
IND
IDN
IRL
JOR
KAZ
KEN
KGZ
LAO
LVA
LBN
LTU
MDG
MYS
MUS
MEX
MDA
MAR
NAM
NIC
N A
PAK
PAN PRY
PER
PHL
POL
ROU
RUS
SEN
SRB
SVK
SVN
ZAF
KOR
LKA
SWE
SYR
TZA
THA
TUN
TURUGA
UKR
URYUZB
VNM
ZMB
Johnson (1949) Bimodality Condition
The figure plots the lower bound of the condition for bimodality of the distribution of
export intensity stated in equation (8) when revenue shifters are distributed lognormal
along with the country-specific estimates of σ2zd ` σ2zx.
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size, we calculate Bh
LN peq
Bpsd{sxq :
BhLN peq
B psd{sxq “ exp
»—–´
´
ln
´
e
1´e
¯
` lnpsd{sxq
¯2
2pσ2zd ` σ2zxq
fiffiflloooooooooooooooooooooomoooooooooooooooooooooon
ą0
¨
´
”
ln
´
e
1´e
¯
` lnpsd{sxq
ı
σ2zd ` σ2zx
¨ psd{sxq´1loooomoooon
ą0
. (A.18)
The sign of (A.18) is therefore determined by the sign of the second term. Thus, it follows that
BhLN peq
Bpsd{sxq ą 0 if e ă emed, and vice versa when e ą emed. This means that when the size of the
domestic market increases relative to the foreign market, the mass of firms with export intensity
below the median increases, while the share of high-intensity exporters falls.
A.2.2 Gamma
Rewrite (A.10) as:
hγpeq “ psdsxq
α
Bpα, αq ˆ
eα´1p1´ eqα´1
rsxp1´ eq ` sdes2α
. (A.19)
Thus, it follows that when α ă 1,
lim
eÑ0h
γpeq “ lim
eÑ1h
γpeq Ñ `8, (A.20)
which proves that the distribution (A.19) has modes at 0 and 1. We then need to verify that when
α ă 1, hγpeq has no additional modes; in other words, we need to show that hγpeq does not have
any local maxima in the interior of the support.
We can find the critical points of (A.19) by taking the derivative with respect to e and setting
it equal to zero:
dhγpeq
de
“
eα´2
”´
sd
sx
¯
e` p1´ eq
ı´p2α`1q ”
sd
sx
p1´ eq
ıα
pe´ 1q2Bpα, αq ˆ
`
Ae2 `Be` C˘ “ 0, (A.21)
where A “ 2 psd{sx ´ 1q, B “ p3´ αq ´ psd{sxqp1` αq and C “ α´ 1.
We use the intermediate value theorem to show that only one of the roots of the quadratic
polynomial Ppeq “ Ae2 ` Be` C lies in the interval p0, 1q, by showing that Pp0q ¨ Pp1q ă 0 when
α ă 1:
Pp0q “ C “ α´ 1. (A.22)
Pp1q “ A`B ` C “ 2 psd{sx ´ 1q ` p3´ αq ´ psd{sxqp1` αq ` α´ 1 “ psd{sxqp1´ αq. (A.23)
Since hγpeq is continuous and has two asymptotes at 0 and 1 when α ă 1, it follows that the critical
value in the interior of the interval p0, 1q has to be a minimum. Otherwise, if a local maximum (i.e.
a third mode) were to exist in the interior of the support, it would be necessary for hγpeq to have
at least two critical points in the support. This shows that when α ă 1, the distribution of export
intensity is bimodal.
When α ą 1, we have hγp0q “ hγp1q “ 0, and still only one critical point in the interior of the
support, which shows that the distribution of export intensity is unimodal.
43
When α “ 1, hγp0q “ sd{sx and hγp1q “ sx{sd, since Bp1, 1q “ 1. Moreover, since
dhγpeq
de
“ psdsxqpsx ´ sdqrsxp1´ eq ` sdes3
, (A.24)
there is a mode at 1 when sd{sx ă 1 because the pdf is strictly increasing; conversely, when
sd{sx ą 1 the unique mode is at 0. When sd{sx “ 1, then the distribution of export intensity
becomes the uniform distribution, which is considered unimodal.
It is straightforward to see that the pdf hγpeq is skewed to the left when sd{sx ą 1 (i.e. that for
any e P p0, 1q, hγpeq ą hγp1´ eq), and therefore, that when α ă 1, the major mode is located at 0.
Conversely, when sd{sx ă 1, the pdf is right-skewed, which means that the major mode is located
at 1. When sd{sx “ 1, then hγpeq “ hγp1´ eq, which means that the pdf is symmetric around 0.5.
A.2.3 Fre´chet
We first rewrite (A.13) as:
hFre´chetpeq “ α psdsxqα ˆ e
α´1p1´ eqα´1“
sαxp1´ eqα ` sαd eα
‰2 , e P p0, 1q. (A.25)
Thus, just as in the case of the gamma-distributed revenue shifters above, it follows that
lim
eÑ0h
Fre´chetpeq “ lim
eÑ1h
Fre´chetpeq Ñ `8, (A.26)
when α ă 1. Which proves that the distribution (A.25) has modes at 0 and 1.
Unlike in the case of gamma-distributed revenue shifters, we cannot prove analytically that
there is a unique critical point for the pdf (A.13) in the interior of the support. Instead, we solve
numerically the non-linear equation dh
Fre´chetpeq
de “ 0 over a 100 ˆ 100 grid for the shape and scale
parameter. For each pair of parameters we solve the first-order condition using 500 different starting
values in the interval p0, 1q. We find that when α ă 1, we always converge to the same solution (a
minimum), regardless of the starting value. This exercise suggests that hFre´chetpeq has no additional
modes other than 0 and 1.
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 3.
A.3.1 Lognormal
Since the ratio of two independent lognormal random variables is itself a lognormal random variable,
it follows that the median of the ratio Zx{Zd is zmed “ exprlnpsx{sdqs “ sx{sd.
We then use the fact that the median of a monotone transformation of a random variable is
equal to the transformation of the median. That is, if E and Z are random variables and E “ jpZq,
with jp¨q being a monotone function, then emed “ j `zmed˘. Since E “ jpZq “ Z1`Z , it follows that:
emed “
sx
sd
1` sxsd
“ sx
sd ` sx . (A.27)
A.3.2 Gamma
We use the result that the ratio of two independent gamma-distributed random variables Zd „
Γpα, sdq and Zx „ Γpα, sxq can be expressed in terms of the F distribution (Johnson et al., 1995).
Namely,
αsd
αsx
¨ Zx
Zd
„ F p2α, 2αq. (A.28)
Since the median of a random variable distributed F with the same number of degrees of freedom in
the numerator and denominator is 1, then it follows from (A.28) that the median of the ratio Zx{Zd,
zmed, is equal to sd{sx. Using again the result that the median of a monotone transformation of a
random variable is equal to the transformation of the median again, we obtain emed “ sxsd`sx .
A.3.3 Fre´chet
Using (A.12), we can easily find the median export intensity by solving the equationHFre´chetpemedq “
0.5: ”´
sd
sx
¯´
emed
1´emed
¯ıα
1`
”´
sd
sx
¯´
emed
1´emed
¯ıα “ 0.5, (A.29)
which results in emed “ sxsd`sx .
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B Calculating the Volatility of Sales among Exporters
Let rtpωq denote total sales for firm ω, and g prtpωqq ” ln rtpωq ´ ln rt´1pωq “ ∆ ln rtpωq its growth
rate. More specifically,
gprtq “ ∆ ln
”ÿ
iPtd,xuΦpωq ¨ si ¨ zipωq ¨ it
ı
. (B.1)
Recall that we have assumed that temporary demand shocks, it, are such that Epitq “ 1 and
Varpitq “ ν2i . Thus, let  ” rdt dt´1 xt xt´1s, and  “ r1 1 1 1s1.
Following Vannoorenberghe (2012), we use the Delta method to approximate the volatility of
the growth rate of total sales by:
Volpgtq « r∇gtpqs1 ¨ V pq ¨ r∇gtpqs, (B.2)
where ∇gtpq ”
” Bgt
Bdt
ˇˇˇ
“
Bgt
Bdt´1
ˇˇˇ
“
Bgt
Bxt
ˇˇˇ
“
Bgt
Bxt´1
ˇˇˇ
“
ı1
and V pq “
¨˚
˚˝ν
2
d 0 0 0
0 ν2d 0 0
0 0 ν2x 0
0 0 0 ν2x
‹˛‹‚.
Replacing
Bgt
Bdt “
Adzddt
Adzddt ` τ1´σAxzxxt
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ
“
“ Zd
Zd ` Zx “ 1´ E,
Bgt
Bdt´1 “ ´
Adzddt´1
Adzddt´1 ` τ1´σAxzxxt´1
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ
“
“ ´ Zd
Zd ` Zx “ ´p1´ Eq,
Bgt
Bxt “
Axzxxt
Adzddt ` τ1´σAxzxxt
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ
“
“ Zx
Zd ` Zx “ E,
Bgt
Bxt´1 “ ´
Axzxxt´1
Adzddt´1 ` τ1´σAxzxxt´1
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ
“
“ ´ Zx
Zd ` Zx “ ´E.
in (B.2) yields:
Volpgtq « 2
“p1´ Eq2ν2d ` E2ν2x‰ , (B.3)
which is minimized at the level of export intensity E˚ “ ν2d
ν2d`ν2x .
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C Country-Specific Estimates of Shape Parameters
Table C.1: Country-Specific Estimates of Shape Parameter
Distribution: Lognormal Gamma Fre´chet Distribution: Lognormal Gamma Fre´chet
Parameter: σ2zd ` σ2zx α α Parameter: σ2zd ` σ2zx α α
Country: (1) (2) (3) Country: (4) (5) (6)
Albania 11.444 0.375 0.469 Lithuania 7.541 0.521 0.603
Argentina 3.191 1.047 1.042 Madagascar 12.988 0.441 0.527
Armenia 6.226 0.648 0.727 Malaysia 4.264 0.843 0.893
Bangladesh 5.788 0.878 1.062 Mauritius 9.933 0.426 0.515
Belarus 4.163 0.825 0.865 Mexico 4.643 0.798 0.855
Bolivia 6.299 0.622 0.698 Moldova 6.806 0.561 0.639
Bosnia & Herzegovina 6.584 0.616 0.695 Morocco 11.823 0.501 0.597
Brazil 5.531 0.765 0.847 Namibia 10.602 0.447 0.535
Bulgaria 7.301 0.539 0.619 Nicaragua 6.861 0.599 0.680
Chile 5.765 0.673 0.744 Nigeria 4.970 0.766 0.834
China 8.102 0.524 0.609 Pakistan 8.750 0.457 0.548
Colombia 3.079 1.057 1.041 Panama 6.647 0.625 0.707
Costa Rica 6.847 0.598 0.678 Paraguay 6.536 0.595 0.672
Croatia 6.142 0.631 0.706 Peru 7.447 0.561 0.644
Czech Rep. 4.451 0.790 0.838 Philippines 13.811 0.415 0.497
Ecuador 6.580 0.638 0.721 Poland 4.470 0.815 0.867
Egypt 5.380 0.731 0.804 Romania 7.148 0.541 0.622
El Salvador 7.465 0.561 0.644 Russian Fed. 3.067 1.121 1.108
Estonia 6.427 0.588 0.663 Senegal 5.555 0.712 0.786
Ethiopia 7.553 0.541 0.623 Serbia 2.630 1.194 1.148
FYR Macedonia 7.369 0.516 0.598 Slovak Rep. 5.684 0.662 0.732
Ghana 4.307 0.878 0.937 Slovenia 4.082 0.810 0.843
Guatemala 6.285 0.663 0.746 South Africa 2.716 1.211 1.169
Honduras 10.209 0.428 0.515 Sri Lanka 6.892 0.732 0.860
Hungary 5.535 0.678 0.746 Sweden 4.765 0.735 0.789
India 8.760 0.498 0.584 Syrian Arab Rep. 3.871 0.929 0.966
Indonesia 7.072 0.553 0.632 Tanzania 5.299 0.751 0.824
Ireland 8.778 0.485 0.571 Thailand 6.985 0.562 0.641
Jordan 6.490 0.589 0.665 Tunisia 9.552 0.424 0.515
Kazakhstan 4.013 0.920 0.970 Turkey 6.668 0.607 0.686
Kenya 6.181 0.671 0.753 Uganda 6.661 0.630 0.713
Korea, Rep. 4.948 0.728 0.786 Ukraine 4.145 0.881 0.929
Kyrgyz Rep. 4.881 0.742 0.800 Uruguay 6.874 0.575 0.654
Lao PDR 6.087 0.604 0.676 Uzbekistan 6.548 0.620 0.699
Latvia 7.852 0.505 0.589 Vietnam 7.663 0.507 0.591
Lebanon 3.175 0.997 0.986 Zambia 6.066 0.717 0.808
Coefficients estimated by maximum likelihood, conditional on sd{sx being given by equation (10). All estimated
shape parameters are statistically different from 0 at the 1% level.
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D Vuong (1989) Test for Selection of Non-Nested Models
In this section we briefly describe how the Vuong (1989) test statistic is calculated and we present
our results in Table D.1. Below we briefly describe how the test statistic is
Consider two competing parametric models of the distribution of export intensity indexed by
k “ 1, 2. Let hk `e|θk, sd{sx˘ denote the density of model k conditional on the shape parameter θk
(estimated by maximum likelihood) and sd{sx respectively, where the notation reflects the fact that
the scale parameter is the same across all models, and equal to 1{emed´1, as shown in Proposition
3.
Vuong (1989) shows that the LR test statistic
Ψ “
řn
i“1
“
ln
`
h1
`
ei|θ1, sd{sx
˘˘´ ln `h2 `ei|θ2, sd{sx˘˘‰?
npω2 dÝÑ N p0, 1q, (D.1)
where pω2 ” 1n řni“1 „ln h1pei|θ1,sd{sxqh2pei|θ2,sd{sxq
2
´
„
1
n
řn
i“1 ln
h1pei|θ1,sd{sxq
h2pei|θ2,sd{sxq
2
, is the variance of the limiting
normal distribution of the LR statistic, and n denotes the sample size.
Thus, for a given critical value c for the standard normal distribution (e.g. c “ 1.96 at the 5%
significance level, or, c “ 2.58 at the 1% level), the directional test for model selection recommends:
• If Ψ ą c, reject the null hypothesis that models 1 and 2 are equivalent in favor of h1 `e|θ1, sd{sx˘
being better than h2
`
e|θ2, sd{sx
˘
.
• If Ψ ă ´c, reject the null hypothesis that models 1 and 2 are equivalent in favor of h2 `e|θ2, sd{sx˘
being better than h2
`
e|θ2, sd{sx
˘
.
• If |Ψ| ď c, then one cannot discriminate between the two competing models given the data.
We use the Vuong test statistic in two ways:
1. We compare the performance of the three different parametric models that we propose in the
paper (lognormal, gamma, Fre´chet) to fit the export intensity data across countries.
2. For each distribution of revenue shifters, we compare the performance a model in which the
shape parameter is estimated for each country individually against a ‘restricted’ model with
a single shape parameter estimated by pooling data for all countries. The latter model is
indexed by the subscript r in Table D.1.
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